Since the 1960s, the Porte de Namur district, better known as Matonge, long embodied this meeting point. Almost every Congolese arriving from the Democratic Republic of the Congo made, and still makes, a symbolic stop in Brussels, particularly in Matonge, to reconnect with a familiar atmosphere. Once a space mainly frequented by students, the neighbourhood gradually welcomed musicians, street vendors, and then a more diversified commercial activity. Today, it must be acknowledged that Congolese traders have largely disappeared, replaced by Indian and Pakistani shopkeepers who have become the main economic actors in the area. An evolution that recalls, not without historical irony, the dominance of markets in the eastern Congo by Asian traders before independence.

In recent times, the term or label “Rwandan” has been used to justify violence, exclusion, and political score-settling. We are witnessing a dangerous generalisation of this label, applied to anyone who disagrees with those in power or refuses to follow the government line. Worse still, any critical voice, especially if it is not aligned with the regime, is quickly branded as Rwandan.

The right of states to use force in self-defence occupies a central yet deeply contested place in contemporary international law. Enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter as an exception to the general prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4), self-defence has traditionally been understood as a narrowly circumscribed right exercised in response to an armed attack attributable to another state. However, the rise of transnational armed groups and the security shocks of the post-9/11 era have placed unprecedented strain on this framework. This blog examines the scope of self-defence against non-state actors and situates the debate within broader theoretical disagreements between realism and institutionalism in international security studies.

On 12 November, we hosted our long-awaited event at VU Amsterdam on the theme The Legal Perspectives on Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War. Through a panel discussion followed by the screening of the film Muganga l’homme qui soigne, the audience was invited to confront one of the most devastating patterns of armed conflict where sexual violence is systematically used to terrorise and fracture entire communities.

What makes the conflict in eastern DRC different from the Israel–Hamas war? The key lies in how international law classifies armed conflicts. International and non-international conflicts follow different rules, shaping state responsibility and global responses. While Israel–Hamas can be read as an international conflict, the DRC–M23 remains non-international under the ICJ’s strict standards. These distinctions are far from technicalities: they define sovereignty, self-defence, and the role of the international community.

In 2020, the Trump administration broke new ground by sanctioning senior officials of the International Criminal Court (ICC), measures lifted under Biden but reimposed in 2025 after arrest warrants against Israeli leaders. Unlike ordinary sanctions between states, these directly targeted an international organisation and its officials, raising unprecedented legal questions. This blog unpacks why such measures lack a legal basis, how they endanger judicial independence, and what they mean for the future of international justice.

Tensions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have reached a breaking point. President Félix Tshisekedi’s warning above came amid the rapid rise of the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), a politico-military coalition formed in December 2023 and closely aligned with the M23 rebel group, active in eastern DRC since 2012. Their recent offensives have led to the capture of several strategic cities, including Goma and Bukavu, by early 2025.

It all begins with an idea.The ongoing crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) reached a critical juncture when the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 2773 on February 21, 2025—a landmark decision that directly condemned Rwanda’s support for the M23 rebel group.